It was recently proved that twisted Reed-Solomon codes represent a family of codes which contain a large amount of MDS codes, non-equivalent to Reed-Solomon codes. As a consequence, they were proposed as an alternative to Goppa codes for the McEliece cryptosystem, resulting to a potential reduction of key sizes.
Introduction
In the last years, systems based on the hardness of decoding in a generic code have gained large attention since they are potentially resistant to quantum computer attacks. The first code-based cryptosystem was proposed by McEliece in 1978 [16] . It is based on binary Goppa codes and is still considered to be secure.
The main drawback of the original McEliece system is its large public key. To overcome this drawback, many code classes have been proposed to replace Goppa codes, but most of them were subject to algebraic attacks. For instance, generalised Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes were proposed in 1986 by Niederreiter [18] , but Sidelnikov and Shestakov mounted a very efficient attack to recover an alternative secret key [24] . Wieschebrink proved that also random subcodes of GRS codes -proposed in [7] -cannot be used due to their vulnerability against the code squaring attack [27] . Further instances and cryptanalyses of algebraic code-based schemes can be found in [6, 8, 11, 15, 17, 23] .
One of the recent alternative classes emerged from twisted Reed-Solomon codes [5] . Beelen et al. analysed the structural properties of a specific subfamily of twisted ReedSolomon codes in [4] . In their work, they proved that none of the codes they consider is a generalised Reed-Solomon code and thus the attack by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [24] cannot be applied to their system. Further, they showed that shortenings of these codes up to two positions have maximal Schur square dimension [21] , meaning that the proposed system is impervious to the attack presented by Couvreur et al. in [9] . Additionally, the authors conjecture that their proposed system is not vulnerable to the algorithms proposed by Wieschebrink in [26, 27] . As a result of the mentioned structural properties, specific subfamilies of twisted Reed-Solomon codes seem to be interesting for code-based cryptography. In [4] , the authors propose an explicit subfamily of twisted Reed-Solomin codes and sets of parameters that provide a reduction of the public key up to a factor of 7.4 compared to binary Goppa codes, for a claimed security level of 128 bits.
In this paper, we mount an attack on the twisted Reed-Solomon code-based cryptosystem given in [4] . Since it does not seem straightforward to directly retrieve the structure of the proposed codes, our idea is to first recover the structure of the subfield subcodes of twisted Reed-Solomon codes, which then in turn reveal the structure of the supercodes. We show that for all practical parameters, our algorithm recovers a valid private key from the public key in O(n 4 ) operations over the underlying field, where n denotes the code length. We implemented the attack in the computer-algebra system SageMath [25] and although the implementation is not optimized, it determines a valid private key for the parameters proposed by the designers in approximately two minutes (a link to the mentioned implementation is provided in the paper). Additionally, we discuss a potential application of the proposed attack to the rank-metric version of the considered system [22] .
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the notation, and we state the definition and important structural properties of twisted Reed-Solomon codes. In Section 3 we present the key generation, encryption and decryption algorithm as well as the parameters proposed in [4] . In Section 4 we derive a structural attack on the scheme, and we precisely analyse its complexity. In Section 5 we discuss a potential fix of the cryptosystem, as well as an extension of the attack to the rank-metric setting. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Notation
Let q be a power of a prime and let F q denote the finite field of order q. We use F m×n q to denote the set of m × n matrices over F q and F n q = F 1×n q for the set of row vectors of length n over F q . Rows and columns of m × n-matrices are indexed by 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, where A i,j is the element in the i-th row and j-th column of the matrix A ∈ F m×n q . For a field extension F q ⊆ F, the F-row space of a matrix A ∈ F m×n q is the F-vector space spanned by its rows, i.e.,
We denote the component-wise product of a ∈ F n q and b ∈ F n q by
Further, given a linear code C ⊆ F n q , we define its square as
The set of all univariate polynomials over a field F is denoted by F[x]. Let us now fix some α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ F n q . We define the evaluation map ev α as
Finally, if I and J are two finite subsets of integers, then we define
Twisted Reed-Solomon Codes
Definition 1 (Reed-Solomon Code). Let n, k ∈ N with k ≤ n ≤ q, the elements α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q be distinct and α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ). The Reed-Solomon (RS) code of length n and dimension k is defined by
The entries in α are called locators of the RS code.
Reed-Solomon codes are maximum-distance separable (MDS) codes, i.e., they reach the so-called Singleton bound d ≤ n−k+1, where d denotes the (Hamming) minimum distance of the code. Twisted Reed-Solomon codes were recently proposed as a generalisation of Reed-Solomon codes.
Definition 2 (Twisted Reed-Solomon Code, [5] ). Let n, k, ℓ ∈ N with k < n and ℓ ≤ n−k. Further, denote the hook vector by h ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} ℓ with distinct h i , the twist vector by t ∈ {1, . . . , n − k} ℓ with distinct t i , and η ∈ (F q \ {0}) ℓ . The set of twisted polynomials over F q is defined by
Let α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q be distinct and α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ). The [α, t, h, η]-twisted ReedSolomon (RS) code of length n and dimension k is defined by
The elements α 1 , . . . , α n are called locators of the twisted RS code.
According to Definition 2, a generator matrix of
. . .
where
In [4] , the authors show that by constructing a twisted RS code according to Definition 2, one does not necessarily obtain an MDS code. However, they provide a method to obtain twisted RS codes that are MDS, cf. Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 (Explicit MDS twisted RS codes [4] ). Let q 0 be a prime power, and 1 = s 0 < . . . < s ℓ ∈ Z >0 be non-negative integers such that F q
= F q is a chain of subfields. Let k < n ≤ q 0 , the elements α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q 0 be distinct, and let t, h and η be chosen as in Definition 2 and such that η i ∈ F q
A decoding algorithm for twisted RS codes is also proposed in [4] . Given a corrupted codeword r, the strategy is to guess ℓ elements g 1 , . . . , g ℓ ∈ F q and then decode r − ev α (
Fq . This approach succeeds if g i = f h i and thus, has a worst case complexity of O(q ℓ n log 2 n log log n). Notice that q = Ω(q 2 ℓ 0 ), and thus this decoding algorithm is only practical for a tiny number of twists. In the following lemma, we show a property of twisted RS codes that is important for the attack proposed in this paper.
Lemma 2. Let α, t, h and η be defined as in Definition 2. Then for any a ∈ F q \ {0},
,
, and it follows that
The proof on the converse inclusion is similar since a is non-zero.
The Twisted RS Code Based McEliece Cryptosystem
In this section we describe the system proposed in [4] .
Setup
Fix a prime power q 0 , and integers k < n ≤ q 0 − 1 with 2
is a chain of subfields. Finally, set t i = (i + 1)(r − 2) − k + 2 and h i = r − 1 + i for i = 1, . . . , ℓ, where r := ⌈ n+1 ℓ+2 ⌉ + 2. Integers q 0 , n, k, ℓ, and vectors t, h satisfying the above conditions are referred to as valid parameters of the cryptosystem [4] . They are public parameters of the cryptosystem.
Key Generation
Given valid parameters q 0 , n, k, ℓ, t and h:
1. Choose α ∈ F n q 0 at random such that the entries of α are distinct.
3. Choose S ∈ F k×k q at random and full rank.
Compute the public key
, where G α,t,h,η is the generator matrix of C α,t,h,η [k, n] described in Section 2.2.
The private key consists of (S, α, η) and the public key is G pub .
Encryption
Given a plaintext m ∈ F k q and a public key G pub :
1. Choose e ∈ F n q at random with Hamming weight w H (e) = ⌊
Decryption
Given a ciphertext y ∈ F n q and the private key (S, α, η):
q using the decoding algorithm given in [4] . 
Proposed Parameters
In [4] , the parameters n = 255, k = 117, ℓ = 1 and q 0 = 2 8 are proposed for a security level ≥ 100 bits. There are two main reasons for choosing a small number of twists. On the one hand, the proposed decoding algorithm has a complexity of q ℓ = q ℓ2 ℓ 0 times O(n log 2 n log log n) and thus increases doubly exponentially with the number of twists. On the other hand, the field size and thus the key sizes also scale exponentially as the number of twists.
An Efficient Key-Recovery Attack Using Subfield Subcodes
In this section, we propose an efficient key-recovery algorithm for the cryptosystem and parameters proposed in [4] . The algorithm first determines a linear transformation of the secret locators α by exploiting structural properties of the subfield subcode of the public code. Then, the algorithm finds the coefficients of the twist monomials by Lagrange interpolation. The algorithm finally outputs (Ŝ,α,η) such thatŜGα ,t,h,η = G pub . As shown in Section 2.2, (Ŝ,α,η) is a valid private key that can be used in the decryption algorithm (Section 3.4).
Derivation of the Key-Recovery Algorithm
First Step: Recovery of an Affine Transformation of the Secret Locators
Let us consider the F q 0 -subfield subcode of the code C pub spanned by the public generator matrix G pub . We first state a technical lemma.
where F q is an extension of F q 0 . Assume that deg(P ) < n. Then,
Proof. Let c = ev α (P ) and assume that c ∈ F n q 0 . Since α ∈ F n q 0 and n ≤ q 0 , there exists a polynomial Q ∈ F q 0 [x] of degree ≤ n such that c = ev α (Q). Moreover, ev α is injective over the F q -subspace of polynomials of degree < q 0 , hence P = Q. The converse is straightforward.
Let us now define I := {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} \ {h 1 , . . . , h ℓ } as the set of exponents of monomials which are not twisted.
Theorem 4. Let G pub be chosen as described in Section 3 and C pub = R Fq G pub . Then,
Proof. First, it is clear that {ev α (f ) : f ∈ F} ⊆ C pub ∩ F n q 0 . Indeed, we obviously have ev α (f ) ∈ C α,t,h,η [k, n] = C pub for every f ∈ F, and since α is a vector over F q 0 , we also get ev α (f ) ∈ F n q 0 . Let us now prove that
We observe by Theorem 4 that the subfield subcode C sub := C pub ∩F n q 0 of the public code is a strict subcode of a Reed-Solomon code, since the evaluated polynomials do not have monomials of degree h 1 , . . . , h ℓ . Thus, one cannot directly use the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack [24] on C sub . In 2006, Wieschebrink mounted an attack on cryptosystems based on random subcodes of Reed-Solomon codes [27] . The author's idea is that, with very high probability over the chosen subcode C ′ , the square code C ′2 is a Reed-Solomon code. Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack can then be used on C ′2 to recover the private parameters.
In the following, we prove that for most valid parameters of [4] , and for every practical ones, the square code C 2 sub is a Reed-Solomon code subject to Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack.
Theorem 5. Let q 0 , n, k, ℓ, t and h be valid parameters, and assume that ℓ ≤
Proof. We use the notation of Theorem 4. Notice that for valid parameters, we have 2k − 1 ≤ n − 3 and I = {0, . . . , r − 1} ∪ {r + ℓ, . . . , k − 1} where r = ⌈ n+1 ℓ+2 ⌉ + 2. Theorem 4 implies that
where L = {g 1 g 2 : g 1 , g 2 ∈ F} and F = { i∈I f i x i : f i ∈ F q 0 }. As a consequence, the claimed result holds if and only if I ⊕ I = {0, . . . , 2k − 2}.
It is clear that I ⊕ I contains the subset
On the one hand, one can easily check that if ℓ ≤ r − 1, then {r, . . . , r + ℓ − 1} ⊂ I ⊕ I. Moreover, ℓ ≤ r −1 is always fulfilled by valid parameters since ℓ < √ n−3 and r > √ n+3. On the other hand, if we assume ℓ ≤ 1 2 ( √ n − 3), then we can prove that ℓ ≤ k−r 2 , which a sufficient condition for having {k + r − 1, . . . , k + r + ℓ − 2} ⊂ I ⊕ I. Theorem 6. Let C α [n, k] Fq 0 be a Reed-Solomon code with locators α 1 , . . . , α n ∈ F q 0 . Given any generator matrix of C α [n, k] Fq 0 , the algorithm given by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [24] determines, in time O(n 4 ), a vector α ′ ∈ F n q 0 such that
In particular, it holds that α ′ = aα + b1 := (aα 1 + b, . . . , aα n + b) with a ∈ F q 0 \ {0} and b ∈ F q 0 .
Proof. See [24] .
It follows that by applying the Sidelnikov-Shestakov algorithm to C 2 sub , we obtain a vector α ′ ∈ F q 0 which is an affine transformation of the secret locators, i.e., α ′ = aα + b1 for some a ∈ F q 0 \ {0} and b ∈ F q 0 .
Second Step: Recovery of a Linear Transformation of the Secret Locators
Lemma 2 only ensures that C α,t,h,η [k, n] = Cα ,t,h,η [k, n] ifα = aα for some non-zero a ∈ F q 0 . Therefore, given α ′ = aα + b1, it remains to search exhaustively for b such that α ′ − b1 = aα. This exhaustive search can be proceeded as follows: given α ′ and b ∈ F q 0 , compute the code
If A b ⊆ C pub , then we found a valid b, hence a validα = α ′ − b1. Notice that each individual test A b ⊆ C pub can be performed in time O(n 3 ).
Third
Step: Recovery of a Valid Pair (α,η)
Previous steps provide a tupleα ∈ F n q 0 which can be used as locators for the twisted RS code. To determine a vectorη such that C α,t,h,η [k, n] = Cα ,t,h,η [k, n], we use the following Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. Let G pub = SG α,t,h,η be chosen as described in Section 3,α = aα for some a ∈ F q 0 \ {0} and g i (x) denote the unique polynomial that interpolates the pairs (α 1 , G pub i,1 ), . . . , (α n , G pub i,n ). Further, let I 1 , . . . , I ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , k} be such that S I j ,h j +1 = 0 andη
where g I j ,1 , . . . , g I j ,n are the coefficients of
Proof. By definition,
By interpolating (α 1 , G pub i,1 ), . . . , (α n , G pub i,n ), one obtains a unique polynomial g i (x) with coefficients
If S i,hu+1 = 0, then we getη
.
Final
Step: Recovery of an Alternative Private Key (Ŝ,α,η)
After determiningα andη, one can easily compute a matrixŜ such thatŜGα ,t,h,η = G pub . Then, (Ŝ,α,η) can be used in the proposed decryption algorithm as a valid (alternative) private key to retrieve any secret plaintext m.
Algorithm 1 Key-Recovery Attack
Input: G pub Output:Ŝ,α,η
while g h j +1 = 0 maps a generator matrix of C pub to a generator matrix of the subfield subcode of C pub , i.e., R Fq 0 SubfieldSubcode(G pub ) = C pub ∩ F q 0 .
The function Square :
maps a generator matrix of C sub to a generator matrix of the code C 2 sub . The interpolation function is defined as Interpolate :
We define the function
and the function implementing Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack as SidelShest :
The function GTRS : Below we provide details on the complexity of the steps in Algorithm 1.
• Line 1:
• Line 2: Computation of G sq ∈ F (2k−1)×n q 0 can be performed in time O(n 4 ). Informally, one needs to find basis of the space generated by the family {g i,j := G subi ⋆G subj , 1 ≤ i, j ≤ dim C sub }. This basis can be built iteratively; updating the basis with a new element costs O(n 3 ) operations in F q 0 and must be done O(n) times, and rejecting candidates costs O(n 2 ) operations in F q 0 and must be done O(n 2 ) times.
• Line 3: Applying the SidelShest function on G sq ∈ F
• Line 4 to Line 10: In the worst case, the following computations have to be performed
was already computed in Line 1). In total O(q 0 n 3 ) operations in F q 0 are required.
• Line 11 to Line 17: In the worst case, ℓ · k Lagrange interpolations have to be performed, which needs in total O(ℓkn 2 ) ⊆ O(n 4 ) operations in F q .
• Line 18:
• Line 19: Table 1 : Experimental results obtained by averaging several runtimes of Algorithm 1 on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-7600U CPU @ 2.80GHz. The line annotated with a star refers to parameters proposed by the designers of the system. The remaining security levels were computed according to formulae given in [4] .
In practice, ℓ and q 0 = q 1/2 ℓ have to be chosen small (for instance, ℓ = 1 and q 0 = n + 1 = 2 8 were proposed in [4] ) for decryption efficiency and key size reduction. Hence, Algorithm 1 has a complexity in O(n 4 ) and thus recovers a valid private key in polynomial time.
We implemented our attack in the computer-algebra system SageMath v8.7 [25] , and we make it available online under https://bitbucket.org/julianrenner/trs_attack. Although our implementation is not optimized, we were able to obtain a valid private key for the proposed parameters within a few minutes, cf. Table 1 .
Discussion and Open Questions
Repairing the Cryptosystem?
We notified the authors about our attack, and they validated the weaknesses of the cryptosystem as it is presented above. They also described a possible fix, where a modified version of the generator matrix is made public. The idea is to multiply the generator matrix G pub on the right by a diagonal matrix with non-zero entries y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) ∈ (F q \{0}) n , such that the F q 0 -subfield subcode of the vector space spanned by the rows of G pub is not contained in a Reed-Solomon code. This clearly prevents a direct application of our attack.
Nevertheless we would like to point out that this possible repair might not fix the inherent weaknesses of the cryptosystem. In fact, the subfield subcode of a generalised Reed-Solomon code y ⋆ C α is a so-called alternant code Alt(α, y) ⊆ F n q 0 which also admit an algebraic description. As a consequence, it seems very plausible that the security of the proposed repaired cryptosystem can be reduced to the security of a McEliece-like cryptosystem using the subfield subcode Alt(α, y).
One can then notice that the parameters proposed by the authors are way below those considered as secure for alternant codes. For instance, BIG QUAKE [2] and Classic McEliece [10] (both are unbroken candidates for the NIST standardisation call on postquantum cryptography) use alternant codes of length and dimension several thousands, while in the proposed parameters for twisted Reed-Solomon codes, we have n = 255 and k = 117 with a field size q 0 = 2 8 . Algebraic attacks as developed in [11, 12] should then considered as potential threat. One can also mention the recent attack on the alternant code-based cryptosystem DAGS [1] performed by Barelli and Couvreur [3] . Informally, the authors manage to derive from the public code an alternant code with much smaller parameters, and the last step of the key recovery algorithm -which is exponential in the involved parameters -remains doable due to the small size of the derived alternant code.
Finally, a crucial point is that one can wonder about the possible benefit to consider codes whose security might be not better than those based on alternant codes (for which cryptosystems have been designed and studied), but which suffer from larger key sizes and much less efficient decoding algorithms.
On the Rank-Metric Version of the Cryptosystem
In [22] was proposed a modified version of the previous system, based on a subfamily of twisted Gabidulin codes. The idea is to consider a variant of the GPT cryptosystem [14] , where twisted Gabidulin codes are used instead of (subcodes of) Gabidulin codes. Although we do not claim to have a proper attack on the system, let us show some potential weaknesses which could be analysed in a future work.
A Short Description of the System
The GPT cryptosystem can be viewed as an analogue of the McEliece cryptosystem, using rank-metric codes instead of codes in the Hamming metric. We refer to [20] for more details about rank-metric codes and variants of the GPT cryptosystem. Let us give a short overview of the latter.
Let F p ⊂ F q 0 and Γ ⊆ {C ⊆ F n−t q , dim C = k} be a family of rank-metric codes. the GPT cryptosystem works as follows.
• Key generation: Alice generates a secret generator matrix G ∈ F n−t q for a code C randomly chosen in Γ. Then she computes a public key G pub = S[X|G]P , where matrices S ∈ F k×k q of full-rank, X ∈ F k×t q of rank s ≤ t, and P ∈ F n×n p of full-rank are chosen randomly and kept secret.
• Encryption: given a plaintext m ∈ F k q , Bob computes the ciphertext y = mG pub +e, where e ∈ F n q is a random error with small rank over F p (such that it can be decoded in C).
• Decryption: Alice decodes the last n − t coordinates of yP −1 in the code C and retrieves m.
In most variants of the GPT cryptosystem, Γ is a (sub-)family of Gabidulin codes [13] . In [22] , the authors proposed to define Γ as the subfamily of twisted Gabidulin codes
where η i are chosen in the chain of subfields F q 0 ⊂ F q 1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ F q ℓ = F q , and (α 1 , . . . , α n−t ) ∈ F n−t q 0 are F p -linearly independent, similarly to the case of twisted Reed-Solomon codes.
Potential Weakness
Our claim is that the code C pub generated by G pub also admit structured subfield subcodes which could be used to attack the system. Indeed, one can prove that the last n − t coordinates of (C pub ∩ F n q 0 )P −1 form a subcode of the Gabidulin code
of rather small codimension. Applying variants of Overbeck's attacks -e.g. in [19] might lead to the recovery of a linear transformation of α and thus a structural attack on the public key close to the one presented in this paper.
In fact, we observe in simulations that if λ f (C pub ∩ F n q 0 ) has dimension n − 1, where f = n − k − t − 1 and
for G being a generator matrix of C, one recovers an F p -linear transformationα of α, as well as a full-rank matrixP ∈ F n×n p , by simply applying the algorithm shown in [20, Algorithm 3.5.1] to a generator matrix of C pub ∩ F n q 0 . Then, the coefficientsη are determined by interpolating the last n − t positions of G pubP −1 with p-polynomials of p-degree smaller than n, similar to Section 4.1.3. Finally, one choosesŜ such that
, where subscript [t + 1 : n] refers to the last n − t positions of G pubP −1 andĜ is a generator matrix of Gα ,t,h,η [n − t, k]. Clearly, (Ŝ,α,η,P ) is then a valid private key. Further simulations show that if X has full F q -rank and t is small, then the vector space λ f (C pub ∩ F n q 0 ) has dimension n − 1 with high probability. However, if t is large or X has F q -rank smaller than t, λ f (C pub ∩ F n q 0 ) has dimension smaller than n − 1 and this straightforward approach fails.
Since a precise analysis of the potential weakness of system proposed in [22] is out of the scope of this paper, we leave it as an open problem for future research.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an efficient key-recovery attack on the McEliece cryptosystem based on a subfamily of twisted Reed-Solomon codes. The attack does not contradict the structural properties presented in [4] , but recovers the structure of the subfield subcode of the used twisted Reed-Solomon code, which then in turn enables us to determine a description of the supercode.
We have proven that the attack retrieves a valid private key from the public key for all practical parameters in O(n 4 ) field operations. This is confirmed by experimental results which indicate that one is able to retrieve a valid private key for a claimed security level of 128 bits within a few minutes by running a non-optimized SageMath implementation of the proposed algorithm on a general purpose processor. In addition, we have discussed the security of an attempt to repair the system and potential ways to adapt our attack to the rank-metric variant of the considered system.
Although we have shown that a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem based on the subfamily of twisted Reed-Solomon codes proposed in [4] is not secure, this does not imply that any subfamily of twisted Reed-Solomon codes is not suitable for code-based cryptography. In fact, twisted Reed-Solomon codes represent a very large family of codes, and it requires further research to determine if there could exist other subfamilies that can be used for the design of cryptosystem.
